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Justifying Wartime Limits on Civil Rights
and Liberties
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.*
Many law professors and commentators condemned the Bush
Administration’s “War on Terrorism” as involving unprecedented
assertions of Article II power that sacrificed constitutional rights
and liberties for no purpose, as America actually became less
safe.1 This Symposium provides a valuable opportunity to test
such claims against history, with a special focus on Abraham
Lincoln’s actions during the Civil War.
This historical
perspective casts doubt upon the conventional wisdom that the
War on Terrorism has caused unique harm to the Constitution’s
structure and the individual rights it guarantees.
More specifically, our panel has been asked to address three
questions concerning the Constitution’s delicate balance between
protecting national security and preserving fundamental rights.
First, are wartime limitations on civil liberties necessary to avoid
military defeat? Second, do such restrictions influence the
subsequent creation and enhancement of civil rights? Third, if
these later legal gains occur, do they ultimately justify the
wartime measures? I am afraid that I cannot answer any of
these questions with much confidence.
Initially, it is impossible to say with any certainty whether
or not Presidents like Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt
had to infringe constitutional liberties the way they did in order
to win their wars.2 Perhaps they could have achieved the same
results with fewer intrusions. But maybe greater solicitude for
personal freedoms would have led to defeat, or to a victory that
exacted a far greater cost in blood and money. Speculating about
such matters is an academic exercise. All we know for sure is
that these Presidents took the actions they deemed necessary to
* James Wilson Endowed Professor, Pepperdine University School of Law.
J.D.,
Yale, 1988.
1 See generally DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA
IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR (2007); see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The “Enemy
Combatant” Cases in Historical Context: The Inevitability of Pragmatic Judicial Review,
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1005, 1006–07 (2007) [hereinafter Pushaw, Enemy Combatant]
(citing other prominent critics such as Bruce Ackerman, Neal Katyal, and Harold Koh).
2 See infra Parts I.B & C (summarizing the actions of Lincoln and Roosevelt).
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prevail, and they did.3 For better or worse, the Constitution
commits to the President almost unbridled discretion to
determine what must be done to meet a military emergency.4
These decisions must be made quickly and with imperfect
information, and they are then judged by Congress, voters, and
posterity. All of these groups tend to be quite forgiving of the
President if he triumphs.
Turning to the second issue, the orthodox view is that
Americans, out of some blend of fear and patriotism, blindly
support Presidents during military crises when they trample civil
liberties,5 but later feel remorseful, vow that such excesses will
never happen again, and bestow civil rights generously.6 I do not
believe we can isolate a collective sense of guilt over wartime sins
and attempted redemption as the single “cause” of civil rights
laws, which reflect multiple political, legal, social, ideological,
economic, moral, and religious factors.7
Finally, even if there were such a direct causal connection,
determining whether wartime curtailments of civil liberties are
justified by subsequent efforts to secure civil rights requires an
entirely subjective judgment.8 Most obviously, the immediate
victims of government heavy-handedness, such as those denied
habeas corpus during the Civil War or Japanese Americans
interned during World War II, would find cold comfort in the
later extension of civil rights (particularly to some other group).
On the other hand, African Americans would conclude that (1)
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were
well worth the price of Lincoln’s impairments of individual
liberties, and (2) the Civil and Voting Rights Acts expiated any of
FDR’s excesses during World War II. Instead of trying to figure
out whether later gains excuse wartime pains, I prefer to
concentrate on the dispositive issue: whether the limits on
constitutional rights were necessary to achieve the greater good
of winning the war. A President can never rationalize a
gratuitous abridgment of personal liberties based on the mere
possibility of future improvements in civil rights.
See infra Parts I.B & C.
See infra notes 23–25 and accompanying text (discussing executive war powers).
See, e.g., GEOFFREY STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME (2004);
Christina E. Wells, Questioning Deference, 69 MO. L. REV. 903, 903 (2004).
6 See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal
Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261, 262 (2002); but
see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV.
605, 610, 622–25, 643–44 (2003) (describing the idea of a “libertarian ratchet”—that wars
have produced ever-increasing respect for civil rights and liberties—but dismissing it as
empirically unfounded).
7 See infra Part II.
8 The arguments in this paragraph will be developed infra Part III.
3
4
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The foregoing analysis, which incorporates the lessons of
history, has several implications for the War on Terrorism.9
Most importantly, although President Bush asserted aggressive
unilateral executive powers, his response to al Qaeda’s
September 11, 2001 attacks was fairly mild in comparison with
the actions of Lincoln, Roosevelt, and other Presidents.10
Furthermore, like his predecessors, Bush can defend his
infringements on civil liberties as necessary to achieve his
avowed objective: preventing another terrorist assault.11 In the
past, such success has usually been sufficient for a President to
deflect charges that he went overboard.
Indeed, the majority of Americans have always solidly
supported antiterrorism efforts.12 Although the legal and media
intelligentsia have been outraged by conditions at Guantanamo
Bay, average people do not appear to feel widespread regret that
will result in a compensatory increase in civil rights.13 Rather,
any such expansion would be primarily attributable to the
election of Barack Obama, who ardently supports this cause.
In this Essay, I will devote most of my analysis to the
threshold issue of whether wartime restrictions on civil liberties
are necessary to avoid a military loss. I will then explore
whether such constraints eventually result in an overall
enlargement of civil rights. Finally, I will consider whether those
improvements excuse the infringement of rights during the
military crisis.
I. LIMITING CIVIL LIBERTIES TO HELP WIN WARS
Professors have typically argued that Presidents like
Lincoln, Wilson, Roosevelt, Truman, and Bush have lost their
heads in the heat of war and curbed civil liberties to a far greater
extent than was needed to ensure victory.14 They might be right.
But they might be wrong. For example, perhaps if Lincoln had
been more sensitive to individual constitutional rights, he would
have lost the Civil War and the United States would have
fractured along North-South lines, and then probably further
fragmented into regional nations (or possibly autonomous states).
It is intellectually interesting, but pointless, to try to ascertain
what might have happened if Presidents had taken different
See infra Part I.D.
See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
See infra Part I.D.
See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 608–10, 612–22 (summarizing and
criticizing this prevalent view).
9
10
11
12
13
14
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courses of action. Put simply, it is impossible to test the
libertarian academics’ arguments empirically.
More significantly, these critics tend to make two
fundamental errors. First, they incorrectly assume that the
Constitution supplies fixed legal rules for determining when the
President went “too far” in exercising war powers and clearly
violated individual rights.15
Second, they judge federal
government officials based on hindsight, rather than on the facts
and circumstances that existed at the time those leaders had to
make decisions.16
A study of the Constitution as written and as actually
implemented in wars reveals that the political branches have
enormous leeway in exercising military powers to respond to the
unique conditions of each armed conflict. Given the complexities
of decision-making during a military crisis, it is usually quite
difficult to conclude definitively that Congress or the President
abused their discretion.
A. The Constitutional Design
The Constitution entrusts the power to make, execute, and
evaluate military and foreign policy exclusively to the political
departments, which have the democratic legitimacy, institutional
competence, and political incentives to defend the nation.17 In
supporting this conferral of plenary authority, Alexander
Hamilton declared:
[War] powers ought to exist without limitation: Because it is
impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national
exigencies, or the correspondent extent & variety of the means which
may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that endanger
the safety of nations are infinite; and for this reason no constitutional
shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is
committed. This power ought to be co-extensive with all the possible
combinations of such circumstances; and ought to be under the
direction of the same councils, which are appointed to preside over the
common defence [sic].18

Specifically, Article I authorizes Congress to provide for the
15 See Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 1, at 1005–47 (demonstrating that the
Constitution does not set forth such clear legal principles and that, consequently, the
Court has always struggled in attempting to identify limits on executive military
authority).
16 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 608–10, 620, 623–26.
17 For an extensive analysis of the relevant textual and historical sources, see
Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 1, at 1017–23.
18 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 147 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (original emphasis omitted, new emphasis added); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 41,
at 270 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (to similar effect).
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national defense;19 declare war or otherwise approve it;20 create,
finance, and regulate the armed forces;21 and suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus “when in Cases of Rebellion
or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”22 Article II confers
on the President federal “executive power”23 and enables him to
direct the army and navy as “Commander in Chief.”24
Furthermore, the structure of Article II suggests that the
President can unilaterally address emergencies because only he,
as the sole repository of all executive power and the lone federal
official always on duty, can act swiftly and resolutely based on
the recommendations of experts who have access to secret
military intelligence.25 By contrast, the other two departments
labor in fixed sessions: Congress legislates through a timeconsuming process of debate and compromise, while federal
courts render judgments only after parties have properly invoked
their jurisdiction and lengthy litigation has been completed.26
In short, the Constitution grants Congress and the President
all conceivable war powers, and gives each branch weapons to
check the other.27 For instance, Congress can investigate the
executive branch’s conduct of war,28 halt any armed conflict by
cutting off funding,29 and impeach executive officials for

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12–16.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. This clause does not explicitly state that only
“Congress” can suspend the writ. Nonetheless, this conclusion seems obvious because of
the provision’s location in Article I (which governs Congress alone) and longstanding
English and American practice confiding this drastic power to multi-member legislatures.
See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 91–92, 101 (1807).
23 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
24 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
25 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 471–73, 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 132-33 (2005).
26 For exhaustive consideration of how the Constitution’s separation-of-powers
framework nicely accounted for these institutional differences, see AMAR, supra note 25,
at 131–204, 351–63; Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A
Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 400–35 (1996) [hereinafter Pushaw,
Justiciability]; see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and
the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735 (2001) (examining the meaning of Article
III “judicial power” and the inherent authority of federal judges in light of constitutional
history, theory, and structure).
27 See John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 173–77 (1996) (making this point and
contending that the Constitution does not create any particular process for initiating war,
but rather allows the political branches to work out these details).
28 Article I’s broad grant of “legislative power” has always been understood to
include oversight of all executive branch actions. See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note
26, at 404–05.
29 See Yoo, supra note 27, at 174, 196–97, 218, 241–90, 295–96, 300, 305 (discussing
the power of the purse and impeachment as the key legislative checks).
19
20
21
22
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egregious misconduct.30 Conversely, the President can veto
legislation31 that he believes hampers the military and can
exploit the institutional advantages of the unitary executive to
maintain a singular focus that often overwhelms the multimember Congress, especially when it is sharply divided along
party lines.
Not surprisingly, Article III gives the judiciary no role in
warfare.32 Thus, claims that a military action violated Articles I
or II are political, not judicial, questions.33 The only time judicial
review might be proper would be when the exercise of war
powers allegedly violated individual legal rights. Unfortunately,
the historical record is silent as to whether such cases should be
dismissed as nonjusticiable, treated the same as decisions made
in ordinary contexts, or addressed through a compromise
approach of asserting jurisdiction but demonstrating
extraordinary deference to the political branches. The Court
adopted the latter position, which seems to be the best way to
balance the Constitution’s institution of judicial review with its
provisions entrusting national security primarily to Congress and
the President.34
In implementing the Constitution, all three branches have
determined that sometimes individual rights and liberties must
yield to the national imperative of winning a war. The primary
actor has been the President, who has had to make swift
decisions based on a constantly shifting military situation and
30 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (providing for impeachment by the House of
Representatives); id. at art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (authorizing the Senate to conduct impeachment
trials).
31 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
32 Recognizing this point, the Justices in 1793 declined President Washington’s
request for legal advice on questions related to military and foreign affairs, and they
instead suggested that he seek such counsel from his Cabinet officers. See Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., Why the Supreme Court Never Gets Any “Dear John” Letters: Advisory
Opinions in Historical Perspective, 87 GEO. L.J. 473 (1998) (describing this incident and
explaining how it became the foundation of the judiciary’s practice of refusing to give legal
advice).
33 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 524–25 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961). The Court has always confirmed this principle. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–71 (1803); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 28–33 (1827);
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 38–45 (1849); Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1
Wall.) 243, 251–54 (1863); Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 71–77 (1867); Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770, 774–87 (1950); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5–12
(1973). For an attempt to clarify the political question doctrine by placing it on a firm
historical footing, see generally Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the Political
Question Doctrine: Reviving the Federalist “Rebuttable Presumption” Analysis, 80 N.C. L.
REV. 1165 (2002).
34 Scholars of divergent political stripes have endorsed the Court’s approach of
exercising judicial review to safeguard individual rights but showing great respect for the
military judgments of the political departments. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 27, at 182–86;
Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 66.
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imperfect intelligence.35 As long as they acted reasonably under
the circumstances, strong Presidents who have forcefully and
successfully responded to military crises have always enjoyed the
support of Congress, the courts, and the American people. Thus,
modern laments that these Presidents have gone “too far” often
smack of Monday-morning quarterbacking. The examples of
Lincoln and Roosevelt are especially illuminating.
B. Lincoln’s Constitutionalism
Depending on your ideology, Abraham Lincoln is either the
patron saint–or sinner–of muscular executive leadership during
war. When Fort Sumter was attacked on April 12, 1861,
Congress was not in session.36 Lincoln determined that waiting
for Congress to reassemble would create intolerable military
problems, and so he immediately took decisive and
unprecedented actions.37
For example, the President increased the size of the military,
called for volunteers, and appropriated huge sums of money for
the war effort despite the Constitution’s grant of such powers to
Congress.38 With similar gumption, he blockaded Confederate
ports and ordered the seizure of all ships in the forbidden zone
even though doing so raised serious Fifth Amendment problems
of taking property without due process.39 Likewise, Lincoln
banned disloyal speech and press in seeming disregard of the
First Amendment, and he created military tribunals that did not
provide ordinary due process protections.40
Perhaps most famously, Lincoln suspended the writ of
habeas corpus and jailed thousands of civilians without affording
them any judicial process.41 Initially, Lincoln’s main fear was
that Maryland would secede, which would hinder and perhaps
destroy the war effort by cutting off Washington from the rest of
the Union.42 Accordingly, Lincoln ordered the Army to place
Confederate sympathizers in Maryland in military prisons.43
Merryman, one such detainee, filed a habeas petition to the
See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
See AMAR, supra note 25, at 132–33, 354–55 (stressing this fact as a key
justification for Lincoln’s unilateral assertion of Article II powers until Congress could
reconvene).
37 See id. at 122.
38 See DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 17–18, 117–18, 136–38, 192, 196–
97 (2003).
39 See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 665–71 (1862) (upholding Lincoln’s
actions as a valid exercise of his Article II power as Commander-in-Chief).
40 See FARBER, supra note 38, at 8, 17, 19–20, 118, 144–45, 163–75.
41 See id. at 16–17, 19, 117, 144, 157–63, 192–95.
42 See id. at 16, 18, 117, 157–63, 192–95; AMAR, supra note 25, at 122, 355.
43 See FARBER, supra note 38, at 17–20, 157–163.
35
36
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Circuit Court manned by Chief Justice Taney.44 He ordered the
release of Merryman after concluding that Lincoln had broken
his oath to faithfully execute the law by usurping (1) Congress’s
Article I power to suspend habeas corpus, and (2) the judiciary’s
Article III function of deciding whether citizens had been
unconstitutionally detained.45
Lincoln refused to comply. Soon thereafter, when Congress
had reassembled, Lincoln justified his conduct in a special
address.46 He contended that the President’s oath to “preserve,
protect and defend the Constitution” as a whole justified taking
any actions he deemed necessary to save the Union, even those
that
temporarily
disregarded
individual
constitutional
provisions.47 In Lincoln’s own words: “[M]easures, otherwise
unconstitutional,
might
become
lawful,
by
becoming
indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution, through
the preservation of the nation.”48 As for habeas specifically,
Lincoln rhetorically asked: “[A]re all the laws, but one, to go
unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one
be violated?”49
Yet Lincoln was not the tyrant that some have made him out
to be.50 On the contrary, he had a profound reverence for
constitutional democracy.51 Accordingly, Lincoln recognized that
he needed the approval of Congress, especially because it was the
only branch that could constitutionally continue to fund the
war.52
Congress ratified Lincoln’s actions (including his
suspension of habeas) and supported him for the remainder of
the war.53
See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
See id. at 147–53; RONALD C. WHITE, JR., A. LINCOLN: A BIOGRAPHY 416–17 (2009).
See 6 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861, in
COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 297 (John A. Nicolay & John Hay eds., 1905).
47 Id. at 309.
48 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 691, 721 (2004) (book review) (quoting Lincoln and defending his theory of
the Constitution during wartime).
49 Id. at 723.
50 See WHITE, supra note 45, at 3–6, 417, 443, 519, 553–57, 563–69, 584
(acknowledging the charge that Lincoln acted like a dictator, but demonstrating its
falsity).
51 See AMAR, supra note 25, at 21, 38–39, 51–52, 118–19, 132, 146–47, 188, 196, 275,
368–73, 471–472. Most tellingly, Lincoln always insisted that the Presidential elections
would be held in 1864 based on the timetable set forth in the Constitution, even when the
North was faring badly and there was a very real possibility he would lose. Id. at 146–47.
52 See FARBER, supra note 38, at 18, 24, 118, 137–48, 192–97.
53 See Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 63, § 3, 12 Stat. 326 (approving Lincoln’s earlier
actions); Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755 (authorizing suspension of writ of
habeas corpus); see also AMAR, supra note 25, at 132–33 (emphasizing that Lincoln
sought, and received, Congress’s blessing during the Civil War). For a detailed discussion
of Lincoln’s respect for Congress’s role in warmaking, see David J. Barron & Martin S.
44
45
46
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A chastened Court also fell into line. In The Prize Cases,54 a
majority of Justices upheld the validity of Lincoln’s blockade
against a challenge by owners of seized vessels who claimed that
their property had been taken without due process.55 The Court
concluded that it could not review the President’s exercise of
political discretion, which Article II confided in him as
Commander-in-Chief, to “determine what degree of force the
crisis demands” (such as the blockade).56
Likewise, Ex parte Vallandigham57 rejected a due process
challenge to an Army tribunal created under Lincoln’s orders.58
The Court disavowed any power to “review or pronounce any
opinion upon the proceedings of a military commission”59 or
similar executive wartime decisions.60
Finally, Lincoln fulfilled his preelection promise to decline to
adhere to the Court’s constitutional holding in Dred Scott v.
Sandford61 that the federal government could not intrude upon
state power over slavery.62
Invoking his authority as
Commander-in-Chief, Lincoln emancipated millions of slaves in
rebellious Southern areas, even though such a hugely
consequential policy determination seemed to fall squarely
within the legislative domain.63
The Civil War teaches that a strong President can sweep
aside significant constitutional provisions—including both
clauses that confer powers on Congress or the courts and those
that protect individual rights and liberties—if he determines that
this course must be taken to address a military emergency.64
Modern libertarians who assert that Lincoln went “too far”
cannot easily explain the contemporaneous consensus that he did
not.
The President himself, among the most profound
Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb–A Constitutional History, 121
HARV. L. REV. 941, 993–1021 (2008).
54 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
55 Id. at 665–82.
56 Id. at 670.
57 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863).
58 Id. at 243, 248.
59 Id. at 252.
60 Id. at 254 (referring to Martin v. Mott and Dynes v. Hoover).
61 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
62 Id. at 446–52. See Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, the Supreme Law of the
Land, and Attorney General Meese: A Comment, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1017, 1022 (1987)
(describing Lincoln’s view that Congress and the President, in carrying out their duties
under Articles I and II, could rely on their independent interpretation of the Constitution
and therefore did not have to conform their actions to the Court’s Dred Scott decision).
63 See FARBER, supra note 38, at 19, 21, 144–45, 152–57; AMAR, supra note 25, at
281, 356–58, 373, 380.
64 See CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 25
(1976).
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constitutional thinkers America has ever produced, did not
consider his actions excessive under the circumstances.65
Neither did Congress, which approved his conduct.66 Neither did
the Court as an institution (as distinguished from individual
Justices like Taney), which concluded either that the
Constitution left wartime decisions entirely to the President’s
discretion or upheld them on the merits.67 Last, but not least,
posterity has lionized Lincoln, who is equaled only by George
Washington in the presidential pantheon.
Modern Presidents absorbed the lesson of the Civil War. For
example, Woodrow Wilson had no qualms about sacrificing
individual liberties if doing so, in his judgment, would help
achieve victory in World War I.68 Indeed, even after the war had
ended, Wilson continued to suppress freedom of expression.69
Wilson, however, was merely a warmup for Roosevelt, who
emulated Lincoln in the sheer audacity and scope of his
assertions of war powers.
C. Roosevelt: Lincoln Redux
Even before Congress declared war in December 1941,
Roosevelt had independently engaged in negotiations over
military and foreign affairs with Great Britain, sent troops to the
North Atlantic, ordered Nazi U-boats shot on sight, and declared
a state of “unlimited national emergency.”70 After America
entered World War II, Roosevelt did whatever he deemed
necessary to win it, which included suppressing constitutional
liberties.71
Roosevelt followed Lincoln in two specific ways. First, FDR
successfully seized private property, including over sixty plants
where labor disputes and other problems had impeded the war
effort.72 Second, he created military commissions to try enemies
charged with war crimes.73 In Ex parte Quirin,74 the Court
See AMAR, supra note 25, at 132.
Id. at 132–33.
See supra notes 54–60 and accompanying text.
See Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 1, at 1034–35 (citing numerous
instances and sources).
69 See CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, IN THE NAME OF WAR: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE WAR
POWERS SINCE 1918, at 1–2, 13–16, 191–253 (1989).
70 See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 110–13 (1973).
71 Id.
72 The Court waited until the end of hostilities to consider legal challenges to these
seizures, then dismissed the cases as moot. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. United
States, 326 U.S. 690 (1945); see also ROSSITER, supra note 64, at 59–63 (describing such
commandeering and the Court’s timid response).
73 In Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), the Court interpreted an unclear federal
statute as empowering the President to establish such tribunals, thereby avoiding having
65
66
67
68
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sustained a commission’s imposition of the death penalty against
Nazi spies (including an American citizen) who had stealthily
entered the United States, and rejected their claim that the
Constitution guaranteed their right to a trial in civilian court
with ordinary procedural protections.75 Roosevelt had used
intermediaries to inform the Justices that he intended to execute
the saboteurs whatever the Court decided, and he had marshaled
massive popular support in this matter.76
FDR’s most novel, and notorious, decision was his executive
order (issued on the advice of his generals, and reinforced by an
Act of Congress) removing Americans of Japanese descent from
the West Coast to prison camps to prevent espionage and
sabotage on behalf of Japan.77 Even though it eventually became
apparent that there was no credible evidence of such disloyal
activities, the Court in Korematsu concluded that it could not use
hindsight to condemn the actions taken in the emergency that
followed Pearl Harbor.78 Therefore, the Court held that military
necessity justified the severe infringement of the detainees’
rights to liberty and equality.79
In his dissent, Justice Jackson sagely noted that the “chief
restraint” on the President and his military subordinates was
“their responsibility to the political judgments of their
contemporaries and to the moral judgments of history.”80
Roosevelt’s “contemporaries” obviously approved his conduct. He
was the only President elected more than twice, and his
convincing reelection to a fourth term in 1944 indicated broad
popular support for his handling of World War II.81 Congress
also backed FDR’s military decisions. Similarly, the Court

to reach Roosevelt’s claim that he had power to do so independently under Article II. See
id. at 21–30, 38–39, 45–48; see also Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 1, at 1036
n.136 and accompanying text (disputing the Court’s statutory construction).
74 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
75 Id. at 22–48.
76 See, e.g., A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Quirin Revisited, 2003 WIS. L. REV.
309, 319–32; Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying
the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1291 (2002).
77 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–17 (1944) (setting forth these
laws and their stated rationales).
78 See id. at 218–19, 223–24.
79 See id. at 215–24.
80 Id. at 248. He further argued that the case should have been dismissed because
he and his colleagues lacked adequate information to meaningfully review the President’s
assertion of military necessity but that the Court, having taken jurisdiction, should have
struck down the exclusion order because it plainly violated the constitutional rights of
Japanese Americans. See id. at 242–48 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
81 See Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 1, at 1039 & n.149.
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rejected every constitutional challenge to his exercise of war
powers.82
The “moral judgments of history” are mixed. On the one
hand, Roosevelt is considered the greatest twentieth-century
President, in large part because he led America to victory in a
war that mortally threatened not only the United States but all
democracies. On the other hand, FDR’s internment of Japanese
Americans is a stain on his legacy, an overreaction to Pearl
Harbor that reflected racism more than military exigencies.83
The overall picture, however, is best captured by America’s
decision to build a monument honoring Roosevelt, as it did for
Lincoln.84 These marble symbols send the clear message that, in
a high-stakes war, Presidents should err on the side of using too
much force (including intrusions on constitutional liberties) to
win, rather than risk defeat by showing greater sensitivity for
individual rights.
D. Bush and the War on Terrorism
Since September 11, 2001, America has been engaged in a
unique conflict. Unlike past wars, America is not fighting a
nation-state for a finite time period in a series of battles. Rather,
we are confronting shadowy worldwide private terrorist groups
like al Qaeda, which strike indiscriminately in a struggle that
will probably never end. Accordingly, the Bush Administration
responded with equally innovative strategies and tactics. The
War on Terrorism raises difficult constitutional questions
concerning how to strike the optimum balance between national
defense and individual rights.
Most legal academics and commentators, however, see the
issues as straightforward. They have accused President Bush of
unparalleled misconduct.85 Indeed, many professors—including
one on this panel—have argued that he and many of his military
and legal officials should be prosecuted for war crimes.86 I find

82 See supra notes 74–82 and accompanying text (describing cases like Quirin and
Korematsu).
83 See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 13 (Oxford University Press 1983).
84 Doug Struck, Clinton Dedicates Memorial, Urges Americans to Emulate FDR,
WASH. POST., May 3, 1997, at A01.
85 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
86 See Marjorie Cohn, Trading Civil Liberties for Apparent Security is a Bad Deal, 12
CHAP. L. REV. 615, 638 (2009). The Obama Administration initially indicated that it
would not pursue this course of action. See Editorial, Prosecuting the CIA, WALL STREET
J., Aug. 25, 2009, at A14. In late August, however, Attorney General Eric Holder
announced the appointment of a special counsel to investigate whether CIA officials
violated federal law in interrogating suspected terrorists. Id. Those officials will
undoubtedly argue that they acted under the orders of their superiors, who in turn relied
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such rhetoric overheated, particularly when one compares Bush’s
specific policies to those adopted in previous wars.
1. The Main Features of the Antiterrorism Effort
In this Essay, I can merely provide an outline of the relevant
law. This summary will focus on the two key statutes passed by
overwhelming margins shortly after the 9/11 attacks.
First, Congress authorized the President to use “all
necessary and appropriate force” against those who planned,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks.87
Invoking this
“Authorization for Use of Military Force” (AUMF) and his
independent Article II powers, Bush deployed troops to
Afghanistan (whose government had backed al Qaeda) and
beefed up antiterrorism efforts both at home and abroad.88
Among other things, Bush claimed the power to indefinitely
detain “enemy combatants” (a status determined by the executive
branch) and, at his discretion, to try them by military
commissions appointed by the Secretary of Defense.89
Second, the “Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism” (USA PATRIOT) Act increased surveillance of
suspected terrorists, especially by reducing restrictions on
domestic gathering of foreign intelligence; facilitated the
deportation of immigrants suspected of involvement with
terrorism; authorized law enforcement officials to search homes
and businesses without prior notice to the owners (“sneak and
upon the legal opinions of Bush Administration attorneys in the White House and in the
Departments of Justice and Defense. Id. Hence, the investigation likely will expand in
scope, as has occurred with independent counsel inquiries in the past. Id.
Such investigations strike me as misguided. Most obviously, they compromise national
security by creating a fear of legal liability that might discourage government officials
from taking decisive steps that they otherwise would deem necessary to protect America.
A related concern is that such possible liability might deter well-qualified candidates from
agreeing to serve in the executive branch in the first place. Finally, such investigations
and prosecutions necessarily carry with them a political taint, especially when a different
party assumes control of the White House. For instance, George W. Bush would have
erred gravely if he had prosecuted members of the Clinton Administration for alleged war
crimes, such as unilaterally bombing Kosovo. Similarly, Clinton wisely did not pursue
charges against the first President Bush for his conduct of the Gulf War.
Examples could be multiplied, but the point is clear: Politicized criminal proceedings
against an ex-President for wartime decisions generally are a bad idea. The only
exception would be if a President had committed genocide or a crime of similar magnitude
which could have no valid justification as a war measure.
87 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)).
88 See Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 1, at 1058.
89 See Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2001), reprinted in 10
U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. 2008).
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peek”); permitted government searches of telephone, internet,
financial, and other records; and enhanced the Treasury
Secretary’s power to regulate and monitor financial transactions
involving suspected terrorists and their allies.90 The USA
PATRIOT Act’s foes have argued that it violates constitutional
rights and liberties in many ways, most notably by allowing
either the indefinite detention or arbitrary deportation of
immigrants and by authorizing federal law enforcement officials
to search private homes, business, and records without the
affected party’s knowledge.91
The AUMF and the USA PATRIOT Act have generated
multiple lawsuits, although to date the Supreme Court has
adjudicated only actions taken under the former statute.92
Before discussing those cases, I want to highlight three aspects of
the War on Terrorism that suggest President Bush actually
showed more restraint than his predecessors.93
First, unlike Lincoln and Wilson, Bush did not censor speech
or the press or criminally prosecute his critics, despite their
vehement and often vicious verbal attacks on him and his
antiterrorism policies.94 Admittedly, the USA PATRIOT Act has
raised legitimate First Amendment concerns,95 but they are of a
far smaller magnitude than those that resulted from previous
Presidents’ flagrant suppression of valid opposition to their
wartime actions.
Second, in contrast to FDR’s treatment of Japanese
Americans, President Bush worked with Congress to specifically
prohibit and condemn discrimination against Arab and Muslim
Americans and to ensure review of all allegations of civil rights
abuses.96 Such sensitivity was welcome in the emotionally
charged aftermath of the September 11 attacks.

90 See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001) (codified in
scattered sections of 8, 12, 15, 18, 20, 31, 42, 47, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).
91 Entering the debate over the USA PATRIOT Act would take me far afield, and so I
have merely provided a bare summary.
92 See infra Part I.D.2.
93 Other scholars have noted this comparative restraint. See, e.g., Goldsmith &
Sunstein, supra note 6, at 288; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 623.
94 See Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 1, at 1006 n.8 (citing such criticisms).
In a typical example of intemperate rhetoric, a well-known national columnist declared
that Bush was “[r]emarkably brazen,” had “trampled civil liberties,” had perpetrated
“Republican outrages,” and had gone to “ludicrous lengths to avoid being challenged.” See
Maureen Dowd, W’s Stiletto Diplomacy, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, Section 4,
Column 6.
95 For a thoughtful analysis of these issues, see STONE, supra note 5, at 539–42, 552–
54.
96 See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 90, at Titles I & X.
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Third, Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus
unilaterally and broadly, whereas Bush and Congress left it
intact. The only exception was for a few hundred foreign
suspected terrorists imprisoned at the U.S. Naval Base in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who were given extensive
administrative and judicial review as a substitute.97
Of course, President Bush made many mistakes. Even
though he won the 2000 election by a razor-thin margin and with
help from a controversial Supreme Court decision,98 Bush
governed as if he had a mandate. He came into office with no
national experience and little knowledge about military affairs,
foreign policy, or constitutional law. After 9/11, Bush asserted
97 Initially, such detainees would not be designated “enemy combatants” until they
had received “multiple levels of review by military officers and officials of the Department
of Defense.” See Memorandum of the Secretary of Navy, Implementation of Combat
Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (July 29, 2004) at enclosure (1). Next, a CSRT would decide
whether a Guantanamo prisoner had been held unlawfully and, if so, order his release.
Id. Conversely, if the CSRT affirmed the Defense Department’s determination, the
detainee could be tried by a military commission according to the usual procedural rules
of military courts, except that the commission could (1) exclude him from any part of the
proceeding to protect “national security interests,” (2) admit any evidence that had
probative value to a reasonable person (including hearsay), and (3) deny the defendant’s
access to classified information if doing so would not deprive him of a fair trial. See
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593–595, 614 (2006) (summarizing these procedures).
The Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) incorporated these executive regulations and added a
requirement that the Secretary of Defense set forth procedures for periodic consideration
of “any new evidence” relating to “enemy combatant” status and for an annual review to
determine the need to continue to hold foreign inmates. See DTA, div. A, tit. X, Pub. L.
No. 109-148, §§ 1005–06, 119 Stat. 2739, 2740–44 (Dec. 30, 2005). Furthermore, the DTA
granted the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit “exclusive jurisdiction” to examine
whether the Defense Department’s standards and procedures were properly applied by
the CSRT and were consistent with the federal Constitution and laws. See id. at
§ 1005(e)(2), 119 Stat. at 2744. That court was given similar jurisdiction to review
military commission decisions. See id. at § 1005(e)(3), 119 Stat. at 2744. Such review
would have been inexplicable unless Congress had approved of such commissions.
Because the DTA empowered a federal court to adjudicate claims by Guantanamo
prisoners that they were being detained illegally (the basic function of habeas), Congress
determined that regular habeas jurisdiction for them was unnecessary. Accordingly, the
DTA provided that “no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider
an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained . . . at
Guantanamo Bay.” See id. at § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. at 2742. Five Justices then reached
the counterintuitive conclusion that Congress had neither removed the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction nor authorized military commissions. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 566–95. This
holding forced Congress to enact the Military Commissions Act (MCA) to make plain that
Hamdan was wrong on both counts. See Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (Oct. 17,
2006).
98 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103–11 (2000) (per curiam) (reversing a Florida
Supreme Court decision interpreting its state’s laws as permitting election officials to use
different criteria to determine voter intent in recounting contested presidential election
ballots as violating the Equal Protection’s prohibition on treating voters arbitrarily); see
also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bush v. Gore: Looking at Baker v. Carr in a Conservative
Mirror, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 359 (2001) (criticizing the five conservative Republican
Justices in the majority for creatively interpreting the Equal Protection Clause to
facilitate the election of Bush, the Republican candidate).
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sweeping unilateral war powers under Article II, thereby
unnecessarily antagonizing a Congress that had given him all
the authority he could possibly need in fighting terrorism.99
Despite the potential for inter-branch conflict, Bush’s handling of
this crisis earned him extraordinary popular support.100
His downfall began with the March 2003 invasion of Iraq,
which rested on several assumptions: that Iraq had supported al
Qaeda, that it possessed weapons of mass destruction, that
victory would be easy, and that a thriving democracy would
sprout up.101 When these suppositions proved to be false, Bush’s
popularity began to decline, but then increased just enough in
the fall of 2004 to ensure his reelection.102 Yet the Iraq war
dragged on and imposed huge costs, which exacerbated the
economic devastation wrought by the September 11 attacks.103 A
weakened economy encouraged the government to dramatically
decrease interest rates and to tolerate lax lending (especially for
housing), which ultimately led to a financial meltdown.104
As these troubles piled up, Bush’s popularity hit historic
lows.105 Nonetheless, he continued to assert aggressive executive
powers as if the United States were in a continuing military
emergency akin to the Civil War or World War II, even though
the carnage and destruction were clearly not equivalent.
Moreover, Bush never demanded the national mobilization and

See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text.
After September 11, 2001, his approval rating shot to 90%, and it remained in the 60–80%
range for the next year-and-a-half.
See George W. Bush Presidential Job Approval,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/116500/Presidential-Approval-Ratings-George-Bush.aspx (last visited July
31, 2009); see also Mark Tushnet, The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: Some
Lessons from Hamdan, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1451, 1469 (2007) (observing that Bush
benefitted from the “rally around the flag” effect until 2003).
101 A good analysis of the legal, political, and factual errors that led to the Iraq War is
contained in Louis Fisher, Lost Constitutional Moorings: Recovering the War Power, 81
IND. L.J. 1199 (2006). Initially, Bush Administration neo-conservatives pushed the
President to invade Iraq with the unrealistic goal of transforming it into a liberal
democracy, and they mistakenly predicted that America would be welcomed as liberators.
Id. at 1230–33, 1247–50. The United States then went to war based upon unproven
claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and that he had
links to al Qaeda–allegations which neither Congress nor the media investigated
independently and rigorously. Id. at 1212–16, 1228–30, 1246, 1250–53. Finally, the Bush
Administration incompetently planned and executed the war. Id. at 1250-51.
102 After hitting a 2004 ratings low of 46% in May, Bush increased his support to over
50% in October and November and won a close reelection. See George W. Bush
Presidential Job Approval, supra note 100.
103 See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & LINDA J. BILMES, THE THREE TRILLION DOLLAR
WAR: THE TRUE COST OF THE IRAQ CONFLICT (2008).
104 See Robert Hockett, Bringing It All Back Home: How To Save Main Street, Ignore
K Street, and Thereby Save Wall Street, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 427 (2009).
105 His second-term average approval rating was 37%, with a historic nadir of 25% in
October 2008. See George W. Bush Presidential Job Approval, supra note 100.
99
100
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shared sacrifice that characterized such all-out wars.106 Another
intractable political problem inhered in the peculiar nature of the
War on Terrorism, which measured success primarily in negative
terms—thwarting attacks, the details of which could not be
publicized for national security reasons—rather than positive
battlefield victories, such as Gettysburg and D-Day.107
Symbolically, then, it was far easier for Bush to rally the public
in the wake of the tangible 9/11 atrocities than in the vague
domain of undisclosed possible assaults that did not occur.
My preliminary assessment, then, is that Bush consistently
took strong actions to fight terrorism; that Americans (and their
representatives in Congress) always supported these efforts; but
that the Iraq War and the economic downturn fatally weakened
his Presidency. Bush did not, however, adopt many of the
liberty-infringing policies of his predecessors, such as censoring
the press or imprisoning members of a particular ethnic group.108
In one area, though, Bush did follow the lead of every
President dating back to Washington: using military
commissions to try enemy combatants charged with war
crimes.109 Historically, the Court had rebuffed those few military
prisoners who challenged the constitutionality of military
tribunals, as in Vallandigham110 and Quirin.111
Recently,
however, a majority of Justices have become far more receptive to
such claims and others relating to habeas corpus.
2. The “Enemy Combatant” Decisions
This new approach began with two 2004 cases. First, in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,112 the Court held that “enemy combatants”
who were American citizens could not be detained indefinitely,
but rather had due process rights to notice and a hearing before
an impartial decision-maker (which might include a military

See Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 280–81.
See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the
Lowest Ebb–Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 689, 713-15 (2008).
108 See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text. For an opposing view, see David
Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2003).
109 Military tribunals had been used without legislative authorization or judicial
review since the American Revolution. See John Yoo, An Imperial Judiciary at War:
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 83, 89–90.
110 Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863), discussed supra notes 57–60
and accompanying text.
111 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), discussed supra notes 74–76 and
accompanying text.
112 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
106
107
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commission).113 Second, Rasul v. Bush114 involved Bush’s order
detaining non-citizen “enemy combatants” in Guantanamo,
which he had made in light of longstanding Supreme Court case
law interpreting the federal habeas corpus statute as not
applicable to foreigners seized and imprisoned outside of the
United States.115 A majority of Justices weakly distinguished
this precedent and ruled that this statute permitted these
Guantanamo detainees to file habeas petitions.116
Congress quickly made clear that, contrary to Rasul, its
habeas statute did not give any federal court (including the
Supreme Court) jurisdiction over aliens at Guantanamo.117
Instead, Congress worked with the executive branch to craft for
these prisoners an elaborate set of procedures, which included
several levels of military justice followed by review in the District
of Columbia Circuit and Supreme Court.118 In Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld,119 five Justices reached the startling conclusion that
Congress had not stripped the Court of appellate jurisdiction over
the foreign Guantanamo inmates or authorized their trial by
military commissions (even though the AUMF plainly
contemplated such tribunals).120 Again, Congress had to clarify
that it meant what it said: No federal court had jurisdiction to
entertain habeas petitions from these detainees, and the
President could try them by military commissions.121
In response, the same five Justices in Boumediene v. Bush122
disregarded centuries of practice and precedent in holding that
the Constitution’s writ of habeas corpus extends to alien “enemy
combatants” who have been captured and detained outside of the

113 See id. at 516–34; see also Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 1, at 1048–52
(analyzing Hamdi in detail).
114 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
115 See id. at 488–506 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (setting forth this traditional
understanding of the habeas statute).
116 See id. at 470–85 (majority opinion); see also Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra
note 1, at 1052–53 (examining Rasul).
117 See DTA, supra note 97, at 2739–44 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.,
including titles 10, 28, and 42).
118 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
119 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
120 Id. at 570–606.
For a thorough critique of Hamdan, see Pushaw, Enemy
Combatant, supra note 1, at 1058–78. For a sophisticated defense of Hamdan, Rasul, and
Hamdi, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction,
Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029 (2007) (contending
that the Court properly applied a “common law” model of habeas by interpreting
constitutional and statutory provisions on a case-specific basis in light of practical
concerns, evolving legal norms, and awareness of the comparative institutional
competence of Congress, the President, and the judiciary).
121 See Military Commissions Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2008).
122 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008).
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United States’ sovereign territory.123 Accordingly, the Court
invalidated Congress’s alternative procedures for such detainees
as an effective suspension of the constitutional habeas writ and
as insufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause.124
Hamdi, Rasul, Hamdan, and Boumediene depart from the
Court’s usual approach of deferring to the President’s exercise of
war powers. Instead, they fall within a minority of cases in
which the Court has checked a politically weak and unpopular
President who persisted in exercising war powers aggressively
and in disregard of individual constitutional rights, even though
such tough medicine struck the Justices as unnecessary because
the military emergency had passed.
3. Milligan and Youngstown
The classic example is Ex parte Milligan,125 which came
down a year after the Civil War had ended. The Court granted
the habeas petition of an Indiana citizen who had been given the
death penalty by a military tribunal, which violated his
constitutional right to an ordinary jury trial because he had
never served in the army and the Indiana courts had always
remained open.126 The Court conceded that both this holding and
its assertion that “[t]he Constitution . . . [applies] equally in war
and in peace” could not be squared with its decisions during the
Civil War.
The Court apologized for succumbing to the
passionate “feelings and interests” caused by the grave threat to
“public safety,” but vowed in the future to render wholly “legal
judgment.”127
The Justices knew, but did not say, that they could
successfully thwart Andrew Johnson because of his precarious
political situation. The Republican Lincoln had selected the
Democrat Johnson, the only Southern Senator who remained
loyal to the United States, as Vice President primarily as an olive
branch to the South.128
After Lincoln’s assassination, the
politically inept and stubborn Johnson engaged in an
acrimonious fight over Reconstruction with the Radical
Republicans who controlled Congress, and they eventually
123 Id. at 2244–77. For a lengthy explanation of the implausibility of the Court’s
historical analysis of habeas, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Creating Legal Rights for
Suspected Terrorists: Is the Court Being Courageous or Politically Pragmatic?, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1975, 2020–46 (2009).
124 Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2262–75.
125 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
126 Id. at 107–08, 118–27.
127 Id. at 109.
128 See AMAR, supra note 25, at 220; MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND
TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 2–6 (1973).
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impeached him.129 The last thing Johnson needed was a clash
with the Court, which saw little point in allowing a President
who did not enjoy congressional support to continue to abridge
constitutional liberties.
Unfortunately, the Court quickly broke its promise in
Milligan to uphold the Constitution “at all times, and under all
circumstances”130 by repeatedly caving in to many Acts of
Congress during Reconstruction that appeared to violate the
Constitution.131 The Justices apparently recognized that they
could not risk defying the mighty Congress, just as they had
backed down from confrontations with Lincoln. Indeed, the
Court resumed its posture of deference until after World War II,
when the ghost of Milligan reappeared.
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,132 six Justices
rejected President Truman’s assertion of independent Article II
power to seize and run American steel mills, which faced a labor
shutdown, in order to secure steel for the Korean War effort. 133
In the majority’s view, Truman had failed to show that military
necessity justified his decision to take private property
domestically without due process, especially since Congress had
not explicitly authorized this action.134
In his famous
concurrence, Justice Jackson argued that Truman had
disregarded Congress’s will, that in such circumstances the
President bore the heavy burden of demonstrating that the
Constitution gave him alone the power to act, and that Truman
had not met this difficult test.135 Conversely, Jackson presumed
the constitutional validity of congressionally authorized
Presidential actions, absent an extremely unlikely scenario in
which the federal government as a whole lacked power.136 As

See BENEDICT, supra note 128, at 6–125.
See Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 120–21.
See, e.g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 497–501 (1866) (declining
to pass on the constitutionality of federal legislation establishing martial law in the
former Confederate states); Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 50–51, 76–77 (1867)
(refusing to hear a complaint that Congress had unconstitutionally abolished a state
government); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 508–09, 512–15 (1869) (holding
that Congress could repeal the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over a pending case, which
had already been briefed and argued, brought by a newspaperman who had been
imprisoned for exercising his First Amendment right to criticize Mississippi’s military
government and who had challenged the constitutionality of the Reconstruction Acts).
132 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
133 Id. at 582–89.
134 See id. at 585–88.
135 Id. at 637–38, 640–55.
The full Court expressly embraced Justice Jackson’s
analytical framework in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668–69 (1981).
136 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Finally, Jackson
suggested that if Congress had neither authorized nor prohibited the President’s action,
the matter would be resolved politically rather than judicially. See id. at 637.
129
130
131
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Chief Justice Vinson and two other dissenters stressed, however,
many federal statutes and Article II allowed the President to do
whatever he considered necessary to win wars (including seizing
property), and the Court had often sustained such executive
actions.137
Because the dissent correctly applied the relevant law, the
conclusion seems inescapable that practical factors drove the
majority’s decision.
By 1952, Americans were war-weary,
Truman’s popularity had hit historic lows, and he did not have
the political capital or incentives to challenge the Court.138
Moreover, the majority apparently believed that the President’s
interference with Fifth Amendment rights could not be excused
by his claimed need to vigorously prosecute the Korean War,
which did not pose the same life-or-death threat to the United
States as World War II or the Civil War.
Libertarians who hail Youngstown do not appreciate that the
case was about politics, not law. The same holds true for the
Court’s recent decisions involving “enemy combatants.”
4.

The Guantanamo Detainee Cases in Historical
Perspective
Hamdi, Rasul, Hamdan, and Boumediene bear an uncanny
resemblance to Milligan and Youngstown.
Once again, a
majority of pragmatic Justices capitalized on a rare opportunity
to uphold individual constitutional rights against an unpopular
and politically compromised President, George Bush, who
continued to boldly assert war powers long after the crisis of 9/11
had passed.139
I seriously doubt that the Court would have rendered the
same rulings in late 2001 or 2002, when Americans supported
President Bush by huge margins.140 Moreover, the Justices
would surely have deferred to him if the War on Terrorism had
metastasized into an epic conflict on the scale of the Civil War or
the two World Wars, with attendant national mobilization and
See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 668–710 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (citing sources).
See J. Gregory Sidak, The Price of Experience: The Constitution After September
11, 2001, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 37, 42 (2002) (describing Youngstown as “the backlash to
the legally clumsy attempt, by a famously unpopular President, to invoke national
security as the justification for seizing steel mills during a labor dispute in 1952, an
election year in which control of the White House subsequently shifted from one party to
the other”).
139 For development of this thesis, see Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 1, at
1005–16, 1047–83; see also Tushnet, supra note 100, at 1468–69 (arguing that the Court
asserted a strong role because of unique and contingent political circumstances, not
because of any permanent features of constitutional law and structure).
140 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
137
138
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massive sacrifices. Finally, I predict that when the next Fort
Sumter, Pearl Harbor, or September 11 occurs, the President will
take whatever military response he deems necessary, and the
Court will yield to him.
5. Justifying the War on Terrorism
Quite apart from the issue of judicial review is the rationale
for the President’s actions in the first place. Historically,
triumph in war supplied its own justification for any suppression
of constitutional rights and liberties. In this tradition, President
Bush can defend his policies on the simple ground that they
helped him accomplish his overarching goal of preventing further
terrorist attacks.141
Again, it is possible that America might have avoided this
result even if Bush had adopted a different approach that was
less intrusive on constitutional liberties. Like his predecessors,
however, Bush erred on the side of caution in protecting America.
However harsh the current verdict on Bush is, imagine what it
would be like if he had not acted forcefully enough and America
had suffered further terrorist outrages.
To return to my larger thesis, I am skeptical of post hoc
arguments that particular wartime infringements of civil
liberties were unnecessary to achieve military victory. I do not
deny that, with the benefit of hindsight, we can see that certain
Presidential actions went beyond the pale. Obvious examples
include Wilson’s targeting of political and journalistic dissenters
and Roosevelt’s mass internment of Japanese Americans.142 It is
gratifying to see that President Bush avoided similar mistakes in
waging the War on Terrorism, although he undoubtedly made
other errors.143
Nevertheless, we should always keep in mind that
Presidents in the midst of a shooting war do not have the luxury
of hindsight. History teaches that it is naive to suppose that
either Congress or the Court can stop a popular President during
a military crisis from curbing individual rights and liberties as
he deems essential for national security.

141 Charles Allen, War on Terrorism: Bush Highlights Success of Military, Intelligence
Community in Preventing Terrorist Attacks, FOREIGN POL’Y BULL. 58, 60 (2009).
142 STONE, supra note 5, at 12, 135–233, 284–307.
143 See supra notes 93–109 and accompanying text.
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II. WARTIME RESTRICTIONS ON CIVIL LIBERTIES AS CATALYSTS
FOR IMPROVING CIVIL RIGHTS
Many scholars have detected a historical pattern in which
fearful Americans unquestioningly back Presidents during
wartime when they invade civil liberties, later regret their
complicity in such wrongdoing, resolve to avoid such unjust
overreactions in the future, and try to compensate by granting
civil rights generously.144 The classic example offered to support
this “remorse theory” is that Lincoln’s excesses supposedly begat
civil rights legislation and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments.145 Another proffered illustration is that
World War II ultimately helped spark the Civil Rights Movement
of the 1950s and 1960s.
Collective guilt over wartime limits on individual liberties
may be one factor that has contributed to advancements in civil
rights laws, but it is usually simplistic to posit a direct causal
relation.146 Rather, such laws represent the culmination of a
complex process that involves historical reflection, religious and

144 ALAN BRINKLEY, A Familiar Story: Lessons From Past Assaults on Freedoms, in
THE WARS ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 32–44 (Richard
C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003); but cf. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 622–
25 (rejecting this theory).
145 For a perceptive analysis of the complex relationship between Lincoln’s actions
during the Civil War and the adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments, see AMAR,
supra note 25, at 351–401.
146 There is at least one notable exception where a straight line can be drawn.
During World War I and its aftermath, the Court held that the government’s interest in
winning overrode the First Amendment rights of Americans who had criticized the war in
violation of federal statutes prohibiting both “sedition” (defined as disloyal or abusive
speech or writings about federal or military officials) and “espionage” (which included not
merely spying but also obstructing military recruitment and attempting to foment
disloyalty, insubordination, or refusal of duty). See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 51–52 (1919) (citing statutes). Most notoriously, the Court sustained the
conviction of labor leader Eugene Debs, Wilson’s political foe who had received over a
million votes as Socialist Party candidate for President, for criticizing America’s
intervention in the war and urging workers not to join the armed forces. See Debs v.
United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216–17 (1919).
Such federal government abuses later led the Court to reevaluate, and ultimately reject,
its historical practice of declining to review the constitutionality of such legislation. See
MAY, supra note 69, at 1–2, 13–16, 191–253. Instead, Justices Holmes and Brandeis
developed a test whereby the government could not prohibit expression advocating illegal
conduct unless there was a “clear and present danger”—i.e., a reasonable basis for fearing
that serious harm would result imminently. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
627–28 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672–73 (1925)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J.
concurring). The full Court adopted this approach in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447–448 (1969). A few years later, a majority of Justices upheld the First Amendment
right of a newspaper to publish classified government documents about the Vietnam War
because President Nixon had merely asserted, rather than demonstrated, that their
publication would cause grave damage to national security. See New York Times v.
United States, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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moral considerations, changing social and ideological norms,
economic realities, and visionary leaders.
An obvious flaw of the “remorse theory” is that sometimes
civil rights and liberties are actually enhanced during wartime.
Indeed, perhaps the greatest grant of freedom and equality at the
stroke of a pen, the Emancipation Proclamation, occurred smack
in the middle of the supposedly liberty-destroying Civil War.147
Furthermore, history refutes the notion that America has
progressed in a linear fashion toward ever-expanding respect for
civil liberties in each succeeding war and enhanced civil rights
after each military conflict.148 For instance, Lincoln’s alleged
excesses in curtailing freedom, and civil rights laws enacted in
the late 1860s, did absolutely nothing to prevent later Presidents
like Wilson and Roosevelt from infringing individual rights and
liberties in the course of waging war. Concededly, President
Bush avoided some of the more egregious mistakes of the past,
such as targeting people for mistreatment solely because they
happened to be members of the same minority group as those of a
nation America was fighting.149 Nonetheless, perhaps this selfcontrol reflected the fact that the War on Terror was small
potatoes compared to struggles like World War II.150 If 9/11 had
been followed by major attacks on Los Angeles, Chicago,
Philadelphia, and Houston, history does not fill me with
confidence that the executive branch’s response would have been
as restrained.
Finally, it is almost impossible to prove a one-to-one
correspondence between regret over wartime suppression of
fundamental liberties and subsequent civil rights laws. For
example, remorse over Lincoln’s interference with individual
freedoms did not have much to do with the Reconstruction
Amendments and statutes. Most importantly, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantees of Due Process, Equal Protection, and
Privileges or Immunities were not aimed at preventing the
federal government in later wars from taking the same sorts of
draconian actions as Lincoln.
On the contrary, these
Amendments completed the process Lincoln had started in the
Emancipation Proclamation–perhaps grossly beyond the bounds
of his Article II powers–by guaranteeing the newly freed slaves
(and everyone else) their basic civil rights.151
147 See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text; see also AMAR, supra note 25, at
356–57.
148 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 622–25.
149 See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
150 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 623.
151 See supra notes 37–67 and accompanying text.
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Turning to World War II, Americans eventually felt great
national shame over the mistreatment of Japanese Americans.152
However, that remorse was not the main impetus behind, or
primary focus of, the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and
1960s, which concerned the plight of African (not Asian)
Americans.
Certain events related to World War II did help give rise to
this crusade, but the internment of Japanese citizens ranks far
down on the list. The most compelling argument was that
blacks, having valiantly fought for America overseas and
sacrificed for the domestic war effort, deserved as a matter of
justice to be treated with dignity rather than face continuing
legal discrimination.153 A related point is that massive wartime
production had induced African Americans in the South to
migrate in huge numbers to take jobs in Northern and
Midwestern industrial cities, which increased both their
economic clout and voting power.154 Similarly, black employment
grew in the federal government, which also took steps such as
barring racial discrimination in war contracts and, eventually, in
the armed forces.155
Ideologically, the United States’
condemnation of Nazism and other regimes touting ethnic
superiority forced Americans to confront their own racism.156
The need for racial change became imperative during the Cold
War because segregation contradicted America’s professed ideals
of democracy, freedom, and justice, thereby harming its foreign
relations—especially its efforts to garner support in nations that
had formed after the breakup of colonial empires.157
Civil rights laws also reflected many factors that had little
direct connection to the war. One is the fortuitous emergence of
leaders of various sorts: legal and judicial (such as Thurgood
Marshall and Earl Warren);158 religious and moral (most notably
Martin Luther King);159 and political (the Southern President
152 This remorse culminated in the passage of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which
apologized to Japanese Americans who had been interned and granted them reparations.
50 U.S.C. § 1989b (2000).
153 See AMAR, supra note 25, at 440–41; MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO
CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 174, 181–
82, 445 (2004).
154 See KLARMAN, supra note 155, at 173–74, 178–81, 188–89, 288, 290–91, 444–45;
PAUL BREST ET AL, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
MATERIALS 893 (5th ed. 2006).
155 See KLARMAN, supra note 155, at 178–79, 186 (citing sources).
156 Id. at 172–77, 185, 187–88, 291, 304, 444–45.
157 The definitive study is MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE IN THE
IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 250–52 (Princeton Univ. Press 2000). See also
KLARMAN, supra note 155, at 182–86, 288, 291, 444–46.
158 See KLARMAN, supra note 155, at 193–343, 450–51.
159 Id. at 378–80.
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Lyndon Johnson supporting the Civil Rights Act).160
The
galvanizing event was the Warren Court’s decision in Brown v.
Board of Education161 that racial discrimination by states in
public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause.162 The often
violent backlash to the desegregation cases in the South helped
to turn public opinion in favor of greater protection for blacks, as
social mores shifted.163 Religious faith and values, as embodied
by King, also induced many people to fight racism.164
In sum, wartime restrictions on basic liberties might be one
element that influences subsequent positive developments in civil
rights. However, such limits cannot be isolated as the sole, or
even primary, consideration.
It is too early to tell whether President Bush’s infringements
of individual liberties in fighting the War on Terrorism will
eventually improve civil rights.
However, any cause/effect
relationship would be highly unlikely. For one thing, ordinary
Americans do not appear to have a collective sense of guilt about
the Bush Administration’s actions taken pursuant to the AUMF
and USA PATRIOT Act,165 and the Democrats who gained control
of the White House and Congress in the 2008 elections have not
repealed or significantly amended those laws. Indeed, even today
only a minority of Americans support closing the Guantanamo
prison,166 which Barack Obama has yet to shut down167 even
though the intellectual elite have cited it as the crowning symbol
of Bush’s tyranny.168 Any future expansion of civil rights will
reflect the election of Barack Obama and a more liberal stance on
this issue, not regret over antiterrorism policies.

See id. at 436.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See id. at 489–96.
See KLARMAN, supra note 155, at 442. For an exhaustive and insightful analysis
of Brown and its impact, see id. at 290–442.
164 Id. at 377–78.
165 See Lydia Saad, Americans Generally Comfortable with Patriot Act, GALLUP, Mar.
8, 2004, http://www.gallup.com/poll/10858/Americans-Generally-Comfortable-PatriotAct.aspx.
166 See Lymari Morales, Americans Send No Clear Mandate on Guantanamo Bay,
GALLUP, Jan. 21, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/113893/Americans-Send-No-ClearMandate-Guantanamo-Bay.aspx (documenting that only 35% of Americans favor closing
Guantanamo, about the same percentage as in 2007).
167 See Peter Baker, The Words Have Changed, But Have the Policies?, NEW YORK
TIMES, April 3, 2009 (noting that President Obama has left Guantanamo open and has
continued most of Bush’s military policies).
168 For example, David Cole, the most prolific critic of the Bush Administration’s
policies, conceded that cases like Rasul had little legal basis but rather embodied the
majority’s concern that Guantanamo had become an “international embarrassment.” See
David Cole, The Idea of Humanity: Human Rights and Immigrants’ Rights, 37 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 627, 651–53 (2006).
160
161
162
163
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A final difficulty with the “remorse theory” is that many
distinguished judges and scholars have posited the opposite
hypothesis: that when the President asserts increased powers
during an emergency, they tend to become permanent and
diminish individual rights and freedoms, especially when the
Court approves them.169 A well-known articulation of this
position can be found in Justice Jackson’s dissent from the
Court’s decision to uphold the federal government’s internment of
Japanese Americans:
[A] judicial construction of the due process clause that will sustain
this order is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation of
the order itself. A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt
to last longer than the military emergency. . . . But once a judicial
opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the
Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the
Constitution sanctions such an order, this Court for all time has
validated [a] principle . . . [which] then lies about like a loaded weapon
ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible
claim of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle more
deeply in our law and thinking and expands it to new purposes. . . . A
military commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and
it is an incident. But if we review and approve, that passing incident
becomes the doctrine of the Constitution. There it has a generative
power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its own image.170

Logically, the “collective remorse” and “loaded weapon”
theories cannot both be correct. Rather, history demonstrates
that the truth lies somewhere in the middle. Every armed
conflict is unique and requires a distinctive approach in
balancing liberty against security.171 Similarly, when a war
ends, civil rights progress at a rate that depends on a huge
number of legal, political, ideological, social, economic, and moral
variables. More simplistic explanations fail to capture the
messiness of the historical evidence.
III. JUSTIFYING EMERGENCY INFRINGEMENTS ON CIVIL LIBERTIES
BASED ON LATER CIVIL RIGHTS GAINS
Assuming that wartime curtailments of individual freedoms
resulted in later enlargement of civil rights, was the tradeoff
worth it? It is impossible to answer this question objectively.
Those who actually suffered deprivation of their liberties would
surely answer no. For instance, Americans of Japanese descent
169 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 609–21, 626–42 (citing the many
thinkers who have espoused this thesis but demonstrating its conceptual, institutional,
psychological, normative, and empirical weaknesses).
170 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245–46 (1944).
171 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 610, 625–26.
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who lost their property and freedom during the Second World
War would not feel vindicated even if they (or their children)
received civil rights protections decades later. Conversely, the
primary beneficiaries of such laws after both World War II and
the Civil War, African Americans, would likely have a completely
different perspective, especially because their liberty, equality,
and dignity had been systematically denied in times of both war
and peace.
In short, determining whether permanent civil rights gains
compensated for temporary restrictions during military
emergencies requires an utterly subjective judgment. Instead, it
seems more useful to keep a sharp focus on the main issue–
whether the wartime limits were necessary to achieve the greater
good of winning the war. If so, then the government’s actions
were justified, regardless of its later treatment of civil rights.
Indeed, subsequent military emergencies might dictate similar
draconian measures, regardless of what laws are on the books.
On the other hand, if a particular invasion of civil liberties
was not essential to win a war, and a President knew or should
have known this fact, the government can never make up for that
pointless sacrifice. For example, to the extent that Wilson
censored expression to spite his political enemies or Roosevelt
imprisoned Japanese Americans because of raw racial prejudice,
those sins cannot be expiated by the later passage of civil rights
laws.
Furthermore, a President can never rely upon the
possibility of such legislation as a justification for gratuitously
violating individual rights and liberties.
CONCLUSION
War is hell. Winning one requires many hard decisions
based on constantly changing military circumstances and
incomplete information. Presidents in the midst of a national
security crisis often conclude that they have to do unspeakably
awful things, as when Lincoln ordered that Union Army
deserters be shot172 and Truman chose to drop atomic bombs.173
Keeping in mind the emergency conditions that actually
existed and the facts the President had available, it is usually
difficult to conclude with certitude that his specific infringement
of civil liberties was unnecessary for military success. It is
equally speculative to assert that regret over wartime excesses
172 JAMES R. ARNOLD & ROBERTA WEINER, LOST CAUSE: THE END OF THE CIVIL WAR,
1864-1865, at 8 (2002).
173 See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 391–96, 400–01, 428, 436–44, 448, 453–60, 463
(1992).
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has directly resulted in enhanced protection of civil rights.
Similarly, no one can objectively determine whether such a
tradeoff (if one existed) was worth it.
As with all armed conflicts, reasonable people can disagree
about the optimum balance between individual rights and
collective security in the War on Terrorism. In evaluating the
response of the Bush and Obama Administrations to this threat,
it is important to recognize the validity of a range of possible
responses and to compare Presidents to their real-life
predecessors, not to some idealized leader.

